

1449A

五部中 五号

國家機密

对米英南戰名目骨子(案)

昭和六、二、一一
連絡會議決定安未

1449 A

一、大東亞ノ新秩序ヲ建設シテ永遠ノ平和ヲ確立シ進シテ世界平和ヲ寄與セントスルハ帝國不動ノ國是ナルコト

二、支那ノ變ハ右國是ニ遵ヒ大東亞ノ安定ヲ攪乱スル禍根ヲ斷テ新秩序ノ基ニ平和ヲ築カントスルモノニシテ帝國ハ全カヲ竭シテ之ヲ完遂セサルヘカラサルコト

三、米英ハ夙ニ極東ニ於テ帝國ノ施策ヲ妨害シ來リ就中支那ノ事變勃發スルヤ益々表ニ重慶ノ政權援助ノ策ヲ強化シ裏ニ支那ノ犧牲ニ於テ極東制霸ノ野望ヲ逞クシ刺ヘ諸國ヲ誘ヒテ帝國包圍ノ態勢ヲ強化スルト共ニ帝國ニ對シ直接經濟斷交等ノ措置ヲ採リ愈々武備ヲ増強シ實質上ノ戰爭ノ行為ヲ敢テシ帝國ノ存立ヲ危殆ニ陥ラシメタルコト

四、帝國ハ凡ル手段ヲ盡シ忍ビ難キヲ忍ビテ事態ヲ平和的ニ解決セコトヲ期シ米ニ提議シ既ニハヶ月ニ亘リ折衝セリ。然レトモ東亞ノ平和確立ニ對スル彼我ノ主張ハ根本ニ於テ對立シ米ノ主張ヲ容認セニテ帝國ノ國是ハ竟ニ實現スルニ由ラウ大東亞ノ安全亦得テ望ムヘカラス

斯ウテハ支那ノ事變定數ニ爲四年有余ニ亘リ傾倒セル凡有努力ハ水泡ニ歸スルモノニシテ帝國ハ其ノ存立ト威信トニ懸念ヲ忍ビ得ル所ニ非サルコト

五、米英ノ態度ハ其ノ野望達成ニ急ニシテ世界ノ平和ヲ驥望シ人類ヲ不幸ナル慘禍ヨリ救ハントスル誠意ヲ認ムヘキモノナシ

今ヤ大東亞ノ前途危急ヲ告テ帝國ノ存立亦危殆ニ瀕セリ事茲ニ至リ帝國ハ盟邦ト共ニ干戈ヲ執リテ一切障礙ヲ破碎スル已ハナキニ立至リタルコト

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外交部、内第十三号

開戦名目骨子案(詔勅=入ル(キモ))

一 東亞ノ安定ヲ確保シ世界ノ平和ヲ確立シ以テ万邦ヲシテ其ノ所
ヲ得シメムトスルハ帝國ノ勳ノ國是ニシテ列國ト友誼ヲ爲ス
コトニカ實現ニ努カスルハ帝國カ以テ國交ノ要義ト爲ス所ナリ

二 曩ニ中華民國帝國ノ真意ヲ解セス徒ニ米英ト結ビテ東亞
ノ安定ヲ攪亂シ帝國ノ國利ヲ損傷セシトシ遂ニ帝國ヲシテ干
戈ニ執ル、己ハナキニ至ラシメタリ

皇愛政權尙米英ヲ恃ミテ其ノ抗戰ヲ止メサル限リ帝國カ飽
クシ其ノ所期ノ目的ヲ貫徹セシトスル固ヨリ其ノ所ナリ

三 抑ミ米英、東亞ニ臨ミテ東亞民族ノ福祉ヲ犠牲トシ其ノ非
望ヲ達成セシコトニ急ムニシテ爲ニ東亞ノ治安ヲ永遠ニ維持セ
シトスル帝國ノ努カヲ阻害セルコト屢々ナリシカ帝國ノ事態
ノ解決ヲ常ニ平和ヲ求メシコトヲ期シ隱忍今日ニ及ヘリ
然ルニ支那事變勃発スルヤ米英ハ帝國ノ事變遂行ニ
直接妨害ヲ加ヘ米英ノミナラス益々陽ニ重慶政權援助、策
強化ニシテ使囑ミ陰ニ重慶ヲ支配シテ極東制覇ノ野望ヲ積
極ニシ米英ノ利ハ今ヤ諸國ヲ誘ヒテ帝國ニ対スル武備ヲ増強シ
又直接經濟斷交等、措置ヲ執リ實質上、戰爭行為ヲ敢
シ帝國ノ存立ヲ危殆ニ陷ラシメタリ

四 然レトモ帝國ハ固忍ミ難キヲ忍ビ事態ヲ平和的ニ解決セシ
トヲ期シ米英提議シ折衝ハ今ニ及ヘルモ米英ハ一モ交讓精神
ヲ示サズ極東ニ対スル無用ノ干渉ヲ意圖シテ我死話ノ國利ヲ

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拘束セントセリ

帝國ニミテ米ノ主張ヲ容認セシ半帝國、自存自衛
 之ヲ全シスルニ由テ大東亞ノ安定亦得之望
 ベカニス

斯クテハ支那事変定済、爲四年有余ニ亘リ傾倒
 セル凡有努力ハ水泡ニ歸スルモノニテ立中國ハ其存
 亡ト威信トニ懸念テテ忍ビ得ヤル所ナリ

五、米英ノ態度ハ世界ノ平和ヲ冀望シ人類ヲ不幸
 ナル慘禍ヨリ救ハントスル誠意ハ認ムベキモノナリ
 今ヤ帝國ノ存立危殆ニ瀕セントシ大東亞ノ前途
 亦危急ヲ生ケル

事茲ニ至リ帝國ノ盟邦ト共ニ干戈ヲ執リテ
 一切ノ障礙ヲ破砕シ大東亞積年ノ禍根ヲ
 斷ジノ外ナキニ至リ

(終)

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註

- 左記諸件、總理大臣談話ニ関聯シ其、内容ニ包含セラルコト
- 一 戦争ニ依リ大東亞共榮圈ヲ確立スルコト 從テ前途ニ洋々タル光明アルコト
- 一 日本、開戦、獨伴、為大ナル策應的效果アルコト
- 一 帝國、米英國民ヨリモ「ルーズベルト」「チャーチル」、政策ヲ敵トスルコト
- 一 南方地域、被壓迫民族ニ好意的考慮ヲ拂フコト
- 外務大臣談話ニ依リ日米交渉、經緯ヲ明サシムルコト

(Item 2)

Principles for Guiding Public Opinion
Regarding the American-Japanese Negotiations.

Information Plan B No. 10
December 1, 1941

Board of Information

MOST SECRET

The present American-Japanese negotiations and matters relating thereto being as follows, we beg of you to guide public opinion as you think fit, with these in mind.

1. The note handed to Ambassador NOMURA by Secretary of State Hull has recently arrived in Tokyo. Although the contents thereof are entirely different from our demands, it has been decided to continue further negotiations.

2. The TATSUTA MARU is scheduled to leave Yokohama on 2 December and return to Japan in the middle of the latter part of next month taking on Japanese residents in America.

3. The circumstances are as mentioned above, but as it is not improbable under the present conditions that the United States might take measures to discontinue the negotiations, it will still be necessary for the people to be prepared to cope with any situation.

Notification of this matter has been made (copies sent) to:

Higher Officials of this Board (Including information officials under the command of the competent government offices).

Chiefs of the Police Bureau and of the Provincial Affairs Bureau, Home Ministry.

Chief of the Administrative Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry.

Chief information and propaganda officials of the Prefectural Offices.

Chief of Information Section, the Government-General of Korea.

(Item 2)

Temporary Chief of Information Bureau, the
Government-General of Formosa.

NATIONAL SECRET

No. 15 of 25 copies

Draft for the Outline of the Casus Belli
(matters to be included in the Imperial Rescript)

1. It is the immovable national policy of our Empire to secure the stability of East Asia and to establish world peace, thereby enabling each nation to have its proper place in the world; and it is the essence of Japan's diplomatic relations to promote friendship among nations and to strive for its realization.

2. Previously, China, failing to comprehend Japan's true intentions and joining hands with the United States and Britain, recklessly disturbed the stability of East Asia and attempted to impair the national interests of the Empire, finally compelling Japan to take up arms.

It is only natural that Japan should try to accomplish her expected object at any cost as long as the Chungking Regime, relying upon the aid from the United States and Britain, does not discontinue its resistance.

3. In the first place, the United States and Britain in dealing with East Asia, have been eager to speedily realize their inordinate ambitions at the sacrifice of the well-being of the East Asiatic races, thereby often obstructing Japan's efforts to maintain everlasting peace and order in East Asia, but Japan has endured them patiently to date in the hope of solving the situation peacefully.

However, with the outbreak of the China Incident the United States and Britain not only directly obstructed Japan's prosecution of the Affair, but also openly further strengthened their policies of aiding the Chungking Regime and instigating her, while inwardly controlling the Chungking Regime and intensifying their ambitions to dominate the Far East. Moreover, they, inducing other nations to follow suit, have now strengthened their armaments against Japan and have directly

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taken measures of suspending economic relations, etc., daring to take essentially acts of hostilities and thereby jeopardizing Japan's very existence.

4. Nevertheless, Japan, patiently enduring intolerables in the hope of solving the situation peacefully, proposed and conducted negotiations with the United States for eight months, but the United States, without showing any spirit of mutual concession and scheming the unnecessary interference in the Far East, attempted to restrain our vital national interests.

Should Japan recognize the United States' contentions, it would be impossible to fully secure the self-defense of her existence and also hope for the stabilization of Greater East Asia.

As this would nullify all our efforts of more than four years for the successful prosecution of the China Affair, Japan cannot by any means endure it for the sake of her existence and prestige.

5. There is no indication in the attitude of the United States and Britain that they sincerely wish for world peace and to rescue mankind from unfortunate ravages.

Japan's existence is now in jeopardy and the future of Greater East Asia is also in a critical situation.

Such being the situation, Japan has no alternative but to appeal to arms in concert with her allies, crush all obstacles in her path, and root out the evils of long standing in East Asia.

Note:

(a) The following matters should be incorporated in the contents of the oral statement of the Prime Minister:

1. That the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be established by the war and that, consequently, there is a rosy future.

2. That Japan's commencement of hostilities will have great cooperative effect for Germany and Italy.
3. That our enemies are the policies of Roosevelt and Churchill and not the American and British peoples.
4. That friendly considerations will be given to the oppressed peoples of the Southern Region.

(b) The circumstances of the American-Japanese negotiations should be made clear through the oral statement of the Foreign Minister.

C E R T I F I C A T E

U.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1449B (Item 2)Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated Dec. 1, 1941, and described as follows: Outline for guiding public opinion concerned with Jap-American negotiations, issued by Information Bureau and dated 1 December 1941. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
6th day of Nov., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
7th day of Nov., 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.
NAME

Witness: /s/ Henry Shinojima

Investigator
Official Capacity

noted Dec 1449B Jan 2

日本交渉ニ關スル英米情報

情報 全乙長一〇號
昭・一六・一二・一
情報 局

- 現下ノ日本交渉要ニ之ニ關スル事項ハ左ノ事ナル
ニ付更ノ含ミニテ司然言ハ概論等御参考相願
一、二十六日「ヘル」通務長官ヨリ野村大使ニ手交
セラレタル文書ハ最近東京ニ到着シタルガ其ノ
内容ハ或ガ万ノ東京ト相違ルコト豫キモノアル
モ交渉ハ尙繼續セララルコトトナレリ
二、十二月二日頃發在米居留民ヲ收容ノ
上來月中下旬日本歸着ノ豫定
三、前記右ノ如クナルモ現下ノ情勢ニ在リテハ米國
側ヨリ會談打切ノ手段ニ出ヅルコト無シトセザ
ルニ管國民トシテハ或然如何ナル事歟ニモ即應
シテキ覺悟ヲ長ス

本件關係（爲送付）元

- 内閣高等官（命令傳達仰付情報官ヲ含ム）
- 内務省警保、地方局長
- 拓務省管理局長
- 道府縣情報宣傳主任官
- 朝鮮總督府情報課長
- 臺灣總督府臨時情報課長

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國家機密

二十五節ノ内第十五號

開戦名目官子案（詔勅ニ入ルヘキモノ）

一 東亞ノ安定ヲ確保シ世界ノ平和ヲ確立シ以テ萬邦
ヲシテ其ノ所ヲ善シメムトスルハ帝國不帥ノ願走
ニシテ列國ト友誼ヲ爲クシ之ヲ實現ニ努カスルハ
帝國ヲ以テ東亞ノ興衰ト爲ス所ナリ

二 我ニ中華民國、帝國ノ真意ヲ解セス徒ニ米英ト結
ヒテ東亞ノ安定ヲ損傷シ帝國ノ國利ヲ損傷セント
シ遂ニ帝國ヲシテ干渉ヲ執ルノ已ムナキニ至ラシ
メタリ

東亞政權尙米英ヲ倚ミテ其ノ抗はラ止メサル限り
帝國カ飽ク迄其ノ所期ノ目的ヲ貫徹セントスル面
ヨリ其ノ所タリ

三 抑モ米英ノ東亞ニ誦ムヤ東亞民族ノ願望ヲ犧牲ト
シ其ノ非望ヲ達成セシコトニ急ニシテ爲ニ東亞ノ
治安ヲ永遠ニ維持セントスル帝國ノ努カラ阻害セ
ルコト屢々ナリシカ帝國ハ事態ノ解決ヲ爲ニ平和
ノ裡ニ求メシコトヲ期シ應忍今日ニ及ヘリ

然ルニ反動勢力勃發スルヤ米英ハ實ニ帝國ノ事變
遂行ニ直接妨害ヲ加ヘ來レルノミナラス各々場ニ

Doc 1449 B Item 2

意國政府援助ノ集ヲ強化シテ之ヲ使職シ陰ニ重シ
ヲ支配シテ近東制覇ノ野望ヲ甚極化シ來リ漸ヘ今
ヤ諸國ヲ誘ヒテ帝國ニ對スル武備ヲ増強シ又直接
經濟衝突等ノ增量ヲ執リ實費上ノ嚴重行爲ヲ敢テ
シ帝國ノ存立ヲ危殆ニ陥ラシメタリ

四 然レトモ帝國ハ尙忍ビ且キラ忍ビ事態ヲ平和的ニ
解決センコトヲ期シ米ニ進言シ前管八ヶ月ニ及ヘ
ルモ米ハ一モ妥協ノ精神ヲ示サス近東ニ對スル無
用ノ干涉ヲ意圖シテ表死結ノ國利ヲ拘束セントセ
リ帝國ニシテ米ノ主張ヲ容認セン乎帝國ノ自存自
衛ハ之ヲ全ウスルニ由ナク大東亞ノ安定亦待テ望
ムヘカラス

類クテハ支那事變完遂ノ爲四年有餘ニ亘リ傾倒セ
ル凡有勢刀ハ水泡ニ歸スルモノニシテ帝國ハ其ノ
存立ト威信トニ懸ケテ忍ビ得サル所ナリ

五 米英ノ態度ハ世界ノ平和ヲ冀望シ人類ヲ不幸ナル
慘禍ヨリ救ハントスルノ誠意ノ認ムヘキモノナシ
今ヤ帝國ノ存立危殆ニ瀕セントシ大東亞ノ前途亦
危急ヲ告ク事茲ニ至リ帝國ハ明邦ト共ニ干戈ヲ執
リテ一切ノ障礙ヲ破碎シ大東亞根柢ノ崩潰ヲ言ツ
ノ外ナキニ至レリ

(終)

Dec 1449 B Dec 2

註

- 左記諸件ハ他國大臣使節ニ目撃シ其ノ内容ニ包
合セシムルコト
- 一戦争ニ依リ大東亞米穀ニテ有立スルニト從テ
首途ニ停メタル光景アルコト
- 一日本ノ軍隊ハ獨逸ノ強大ナル軍力的結果アルコト
- 一帝國ハ米穀國民ニテモ「ルーズヴィルト」「デ
アール」ノ政策ヲ行トスルコト
- 一南方地帯ノ被壓迫民族ニ好意的考慮ヲ拂フコト
- 是等大臣使節ニ依リ日米交渉ノ進展ヲ促ラシ
ムルコト

(Item 4)

MOST SECRET

The Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on
Present Diplomacy Towards the United States.

Information Plan A. No. 8
Decided by the Cabinet Oct. 3, 1941
Board of Information.

Precautions for handling --

(1) The underlined parts in this text are to be kept in mind for references by the leading members of the government offices or by the controlling authorities, and the dotted parts may, according to necessity, be orally transmitted in their essentials to the civilian leaders who are especially worthy of trust from the standpoint of counter-intelligence.

(2) The remaining parts should be positively utilized in guiding the public opinion, but it will be necessary to refrain from publicly announcing them as the government's communique or suggested items, except those which are handled by the central authorities.

The Government's resolution, to cope with present
.....
diplomacy towards the United States, lies in ascertaining
.....
wherein exist the true intentions of the United States,
and in deciding whether we shall or shall not be able to
evade unnecessary conflicts without changing the funda-
mentals of our national policy. It is not a simple matter
of merely adjusting the international relations, but it is
actually the final effort our Government is making in
executing our national policy in the present period of
ultra-emergency. However, it does not only allow pre-
supposition whether we shall be able to achieve the...
expected results, but there is also not a small probability
for the termination of negotiations or for the outbreak of
war. Even if the negotiations may come to a compromise,
it will not mean that we shall be able to snatch even a
day of ease under the present state of international
affairs, and we shall anticipate no great change in the
difficulty of our national life. Accordingly, with the
intention of preparing a structure for certain victory
and non-defeat with the whole nation united together
without letting our people be enticed by the rumors of
the streets and by activities of intrigues by the opponent
nation or the third country we shall decide on the policy
for guiding the public opinion as follows:

(Item 4)

The Policy.

Putting away the extreme views of both the hard and the soft elements, we shall speedily continue with the strengthening of the war-time structure under a strong national unity.

The Particulars.

(1) With the international situation, especially the Japanese-American relations presenting a state of unprecedented tenseness of late, news of objective truths about the liability of a conflict between the two countries in case the present situation is left to take its natural course, shall not be suppressed as long as they are not misinterpreted or exaggerated.

However, we shall be careful not to be enticed by propagandas of intrigue by the opponent nation or the third nation, and at the same time we shall make the Chungking Regime give up all hopes for ever recovering from the discouraging situation.

(2) The following points shall be specially emphasized.

(A) Japan is trying to adjust the difference of opinion with the United States under such a situation as mentioned above, while hoping to execute the established national policies of: (a) Settling the Chinese Incident according to established principles, (b) Establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to accomplish our self-existence and self-protection. Japan is devoting every diplomatic and peaceful effort and is endeavouring for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

(B) The adjustment of international relations shall be completed on the basis of mutual concessions, and it is Japan's wish to come to an agreement with the United States as long as we shall be able to accomplish our self-existence and self-protection and execute our established national policies.

(C) There will be a limit to our attitude of mutual concession, so there will be no assurance that the negotiations may not end in discord, or

(Item 4)

that the situation may come to a sudden change and rush into the worse circumstances. Therefore, the people, especially at this moment, shall have to be strongly prepared at heart for the time when Japan's final endeavours should happen to be unsuccessful.

(3) In naturally raising the public spirit against the United States, we shall refrain from making any assaulting statements with sensational arguments merely for the sake of assaulting, and we shall guide it as much as possible so that it will contribute with systematic reasoning to the reconsideration of the American people.

Such speeches as will reveal to the United States and Great Britain our coquettish behavior as if to mean that the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States is the only means for the development of the difficult situation, and such speeches as will weaken the diplomatic elasticity with extreme views like craving for peace irrespective of conditions, shall be strictly excluded and suppressed.

(4) In view of the fact that the Tripartite Pact shall be respected and continued inspite of what concessions may be made in the American-Japanese negotiations, the friendly policy towards the Axis Powers shall not be excluded.

However, speeches that will voluntarily restrict the vigor of diplomacy with such extreme views as regarding the American-Japanese negotiations itself as infringing upon the faith of the Pact, and as placing the destiny of our Empire upon the vicissitude and attitude of Germany, shall be excluded.

(The End)